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Note 
Restoring Truth: An Argument to Remove the 
Qui Tam Provision from the False Marking 
Statute of the Patent Act 
Craig Deutsch* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In August 2009, a patent attorney’s attempt at a billion 
dollar verdict under the false marking statute of the Patent 
Act1 was denied by the Federal District Court of the Eastern 
District of Virginia.2 In addition to finding for the defendant, 
Solo Cup Company, the court interpreted the false marking 
statute in a way that all but eliminated any incentive for a 
plaintiff to seek recovery under the statute.3 The lack of 
penalty given by the Eastern District of Virginia and other 
courts seems to have rendered the statute ineffective and has 
made a meaningful recovery difficult to obtain. 
Section 292(a) of the Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever 
marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection 
with any unpatented article the word ‘patent’ or any word or 
number importing that the same is patented, for the purpose of 
deceiving the public . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $500 for 
every such offense.”4 Subsection (b) of § 292 allows anyone to 
                                                          
 2010 Craig Deutsch. 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School. B.M.E. 
2008, University of Minnesota Institute of Technology. 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). 
 2. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (E.D. Va. 
2009). 
 3. See id. at 801 (indicating an offense is defined as a decision to falsely 
mark as opposed to each falsely marked article constituting an offense). The 
Federal Circuit has clarified that the statute requires each false marked item 
to be penalized as an offense. See Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 4. § 292(a). 
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sue under the statute.5 The informant or relator, i.e. the 
individual bringing a so-called qui tam action, recovers half the 
profits while the other half is reserved for the use of the United 
States.6 
The goal of this Note is to demonstrate the minimal 
effectiveness provided by the qui tam provision of the current 
false patent marking statute and propose changes to effectively 
police the false marking of unpatented articles. Section I traces 
the history of qui tam actions generally, their adoption into the 
Patent Act of 1854, and the subsequent development of false 
patent marking jurisprudence over the past 164 years. The 
current statute, as interpreted by various state and district 
courts, effectively eliminates the qui tam nature of the statute 
by removing the incentive for an uninjured relator to bring 
suit.7 However, based on the limited harm false patent marking 
appears to inflict on the public and the patent system, along 
with the inefficiencies that result when a lawsuit proceeds 
where an injured plaintiff is not present, it appears that the qui 
tam nature of the current statute has a greater capacity for 
harm than good. 
II.  BACKGROUND: A STATUTE CENTURIES IN THE 
MAKING 
The original false marking statute was introduced by 
Congress in the Patent Act of 1842, prescribing a fine of “not 
less than one hundred dollars, with costs” and allowing anyone 
to bring suit.8 Although unique to modern United States 
statutory law,9 qui tam actions that allowed an individual to 
bring suit regardless of injury or privity were once not 
uncommon. 
                                                          
 5. § 292(b). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st Cir. 
1910); Pequignot, 646 F. Supp. 2d 790; A.G. Design & Assocs. v. Trainman 
Lantern Co., No. C07-5158RBL, 2009 WL 168544, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 
2009); Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57134 (S.D. Tex., July 29, 2008), vacated, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 8. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544. 
 9. In fact, only three true qui tam actions in addition to the false 
marking statute remain. 25 U.S.C. § 202 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006); 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). 
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A.  ENGLISH DEVELOPMENT AND ABOLITION OF QUI TAM ACTIONS 
Originating in Roman and Anglo-Saxon law,10 qui tam is 
short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur”11 meaning “‘who pursues this action on our Lord 
the King’s behalf as well as his own.’”12 Qui tam actions gained 
widespread use in fourteenth century England as the only way 
to adequately enforce national policies with limited resources 
over a vast geographic area.13 Parliament deputized its citizens 
to enforce qui tam provisions directed at everything from the 
price of wine to bribery of jurors.14 
As the number of qui tam actions in England increased, an 
industry of professional informers developed.15 Such informers 
were not looked upon favorably, to say the least. In referring to 
informers, Sir Edward Coke used such descriptive language as 
“viperous Vermin”16 and “turbidum hominum genus,” a wild or 
disordered class of men.17 Professional informers were in 
search of private gain, often coming at the expense of the 
impoverished.18 
The “unsavory reputation”19 of the informers appears to be 
warranted. Because the effectiveness of qui tam statutes was 
based on a private reward to an uninjured party, the incentive 
of an informer often conflicted with the policy underlying a 
particular statute. As a result, individuals were often punished 
where no punishment was warranted and fraudulently accused 
of wrongdoing when no wrong had been committed.20 It was not 
uncommon for an informer to entrap an unsuspecting victim to 
commit a crime in order to receive the statutory reward.21 
Additionally, informers often attempted to maximize profits by 
                                                          
 10. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication 
of Qui tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 566 (2000) (“Roman criminal law 
relied on a system of prosecution by private citizens, known as delatores.”). 
 11. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 769 n.1 (2000). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Beck, supra note 10, at 567. 
 14. Id. at 568. 
 15. Id. at 567. 
 16. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 194 (W. Clarke & Sons 1809) (1628). 
 17. Id. at 191. 
 18. Beck, supra note 10, at 578. 
 19. Id. at 577. 
 20. See id. at 581–83. 
 21. Id. 
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neglecting to bring a settlement to the court’s attention.22 In 
doing so, an informer could keep money that would otherwise 
be given to the King under the statute.23 The history of the qui 
tam statute in England lives up to its reputation of little more 
than “legalised blackmail.”24 
Further, the subject matter of many qui tam statutes was 
looked upon unfavorably by England’s citizenry to begin with. 
Several qui tam provisions were enacted, for example, to seek 
out and fine anyone practicing a religion not in accordance with 
the Church of England.25 Later provisions, such as the Sunday 
Observance Act of 1780, created such disfavor that they helped 
lead to the repeal of English qui tam legislation.26 
Ultimately, because of the abuses inherent in a system of 
private enforcement, qui tam statutes in England rapidly 
declined as a permanent police force developed.27 As Gerald 
Hurst, a member of the House of Commons, stated in 
encouraging the abolition of qui tam legislation: 
[I]t is wrong for a free country to allow an informer to seek redress for 
his own pecuniary advantage in respect of a public wrong in which he 
has no direct personal interest or concern. A wrong to the State 
should surely be atoned for by a penalty payable to the State alone.28 
This statement was met with virtually unanimous support, 
and the Common Informers Act of 1951 eliminated English qui 
tam statutes29 and the myriad abuses they accompanied. 
B.  INTRODUCTION OF QUI TAM ACTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES 
Despite the eventual dismissal of qui tam actions from 
England, several qui tam statutes were enacted in the early 
United States. Initial statutes were directed at policing the 
behavior of various government officials and, as in England, 
many later statutes governed economic activities. 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 580. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 293 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1934) 843–46 (statement of Mr. 
Hurst), available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1934/nov/06/common-
informer#S5CV0293P0_19341106_HOC_271. 
 25. Beck, supra note 10, at 592–93. 
 26. Id. at 596. 
 27. Id. at 601. 
 28. Gerald Hurst, The Common Informer, 147 CONTEMP. REV. 189, 189 
(1935). 
 29. Common Informers Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 39, § 1 (Eng.). 
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The most widely utilized qui tam actions in United States 
law were brought under 
the False Claims Act.30 The False Claims Act of 1863 was 
enacted in order to protect the federal government from fraud 
by Civil War contractors shipping overpriced and defective 
goods to the Union army.31 At the bequest of President 
Lincoln,32 legislation was passed creating a penalty of double 
the amount of damages suffered by the government plus an 
additional $2,000 for each violation.33 
There were several rationales for providing a qui tam 
action for such a crime. First, individuals working in the 
defense industry were presumably most likely to possess 
knowledge of fraud or other wrongdoing.34 The qui tam 
provisions created an incentive for such individuals to act as 
whistleblowers, bringing hidden crimes to light.35 As Senator 
Howard stated in discussing the qui tam provisions of a later 
version of the False Claims Act: 
The bill offers . . . a reward to the informer who comes into court and 
betrays his coconspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to that 
class . . . . In short, sir, I have based the [qui tam provision] upon the 
old-fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and “setting a rogue to 
catch a rogue,” which is the safest and most expeditious way I have 
ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.36 
Second, the qui tam action was seen as a way to promote 
efficient government use of resources.37 By creating an 
incentive for a private individual to prosecute an offense, the 
government’s burden of enforcement was reduced. 
The number of qui tam statutes in operation in the United 
States has dwindled. Today only four statutory vehicles for qui 
tam actions remain.38 The most widely used qui tam statute is 
                                                          
 30. Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by 
the Qui tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 
90–91 (1996). 
 31. Jaime McMahon, Qui tam Can, Qui tam Can’t: An Analysis of 
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 17 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2001). 
 32. Hamer, supra note 30, at 90. 
 33. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986). 
 34. Hamer, supra note 30, at 90. 
 35. Id. 
 36. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863) (statement of Sen. 
Howard). 
 37. Beck, supra note 10, at n.64. 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006); 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). 
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provided as part of the False Claims Act.39 Since 1986, 
approximately $2.698 billion has been recovered by the Justice 
Department through qui tam actions under the Act.40 The 
remaining three qui tam statutes have seen less action. 25 
U.S.C. § 201 provides a cause of action and half of the recovery 
to the informer against a person for unlawful dealings with 
Indians under Title 25.41 The Copyright Act provides a cause of 
action for false copyright notice.42 And, of course, the Patent 
Act allows a qui tam action against whoever falsely marks as 
patented an unpatented article.43 
C.  THE FALSE MARKING PROVISION OF THE PATENT ACT OF 1854 
The original Patent Act was introduced by the first 
Congress in 1790 and was transformed by the 1836 Patent Act 
into substantially the system recognized today. 44 Recognizing 
the power that a patented article held in the marketplace, 
patent marking was sometimes abused by unscrupulous 
producers. 
In order to avoid infringement of another’s patent, it was 
wise, just as today, to perform a patent search before 
introducing a new product. However, in the early days of the 
patent system, a patent search necessarily entailed a trip to the 
Patent Office, no doubt a substantial burden in the 1800s. To 
solve this logistical dilemma, Congress enacted a requirement 
that patented articles be marked as such, thus providing notice 
to the public and diminishing the risk of inadvertent 
infringement.45 However, the reliance of the public on whether 
or not an article was marked as patented allowed patent 
marking to be abused. By falsely marking its products as 
patented, a marketer could attempt to create an image of 
superiority to consumers while preventing potential 
                                                          
 39. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. 
 40. Beck, supra note 10, at 638. 
 41. 25 U.S.C. § 201. 
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 1326. 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 292. 
 44. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (4th ed. 2007). 
 45. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“The marking statute serves three related purposes: 1) helping to avoid 
innocent infringement; 2) encouraging patentees to give notice to the public 
that the article is patented; and 3) aiding the public to identify whether an 
article is patented.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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competitors from entering the market for fear of infringement. 
In order to “defend[] the patentees in their rights,”46 § 5 
was introduced into the Patent Act, imposing a minimum fine 
of $100 for an unpatented article marked as patented.47 As 
elaborated by an early court, the patent system privileges an 
inventor with the exclusive right to an invention.48 The false 
marking statute is intended to assist in maintaining the 
integrity of the patent system by preventing public deception 
with regards to such a privilege.49 
D.  THE ELEMENTS OF FALSE MARKING UNDER § 292 
The elements of a violation of the original statute have 
persisted since its inception with only minor changes. The 
current false marking statute, codified at § 292 of the Patent 
Act, can be separated into four distinct elements, each of which 
raises a number of issues.50 
The first two elements are relatively straightforward. The 
relator must show a marking importing that an object is 
patented.51 Such a marking could include the words “patent,” 
“patentee,” or other words or numbers, and, after the passage of 
the 1952 Patent Act,52 “patent applied for” or “patent 
pending.”53 The language may appear on the article itself or in 
“advertising in connection”54 with the article. As evidenced 
from the text of the statute, the critical factor is that the 
marking convey that the article is patented. 
To satisfy the second element, the marking must be 
“falsely affixed” 55 to the article. A violation of the statute can 
only occur by the party that “does the actual marking and 
                                                          
 46. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 833 (1842). 
 47. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544. 
 48. See Nichols v. Newell, 18 F. Cas. 199, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1853) (No. 
10,245). 
 49. Id. at 199–200. 
 50. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 51. Id. 
 52. S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2424. The legislative history provides little insight into why the statute was 
amended to include such language or why such language was not originally 
within the scope of the statute. 
 53. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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affixing.”56 A subsequent seller of a falsely marked article who 
has not mismarked the article does not violate the statute.57 
The third element of the false marking statute requires 
that the article is in fact unpatented.58 An article is unpatented 
under § 292 if it is not covered by at least one claim of the 
patent that is marked upon the article.59 Thus, a proper 
analysis requires first a determination of the claim scope of the 
patent in question followed by a determination of whether at 
least one claim reads upon the article.60 If the article is not 
within the scope of at least one claim of the patent, the article 
is falsely marked. When multiple patents are marked on the 
article, § 292 requires that at least one claim from every patent 
read on the article.61 An article may also be deemed 
“unpatented” for purposes of the statute where a patent 
application is filed but rejected or not yet issued, a method of 
producing the article is patented but the article itself is not,62 
the patent has been invalidated, or the article was previously 
covered by a patent but the patent has subsequently expired.63 
The fourth and final element requires the plaintiff to show 
intent to deceive on the part of the defendant.64 The element of 
intent is often the most difficult to prove because, as in most 
areas of litigation, rarely is direct evidence of such intent 
available.65 In Clontech Laboratories, Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 
                                                          
 56. Felt v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 84, 87 (D. Minn. 
1952). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 59. Id. at 1352. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1358. It appears, however, that there would be no violation as 
long as it was clear that the patent referred to a method and not the article 
itself. “This is not a case where the cDNA library products were marked with 
language stating that the products were made by the ‘methods’ of any patents. 
Rather, the record shows that the marking language included the statement: 
‘This product is the subject of U.S. Patent No. 5,668,005.’” Id. at 1357. 
 63. It is harder, however, to show intent to deceive when the patent 
previously covered the article but has since expired. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup 
Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 797–98 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 64. Clontech Labs., 406 F.3d at 1352. 
 65. See Pequignot, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 796–97 (“[A] high bar . . . is set for 
proving deceptive intent.”); see also Star Scientific, Inc, v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he inference [of 
deceptive intent] must not only be based on sufficient evidence and be 
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the Federal Circuit defined the requisite intent to deceive as “a 
state of mind arising when a party acts with sufficient 
knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently 
that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that 
the statement is true.”66 Thus, there is no strict liability for the 
inadvertent mismarker. However, the fact that an unpatented 
article is marked as patented, coupled with knowledge of the 
falsity of the marking will warrant an inference that the 
requisite intent to deceive was present.67 
After the elements of a violation have been established, the 
question of damages remains. The original false marking 
statute prescribed a minimum fine of $100. The minimum fine 
was changed to a higher maximum fine of $500 because, as the 
senate report claims, it was “interpreted as a maximum”68 
anyway. The statute calls for a fine to be imposed “for every 
such offense.”69 
The question of what constitutes an offense under § 292 
vaulted a 2007 lawsuit by a patent attorney to the forefront of 
the blogosphere. Matthew Pequignot filed a complaint under 35 
U.S.C. § 292 against Solo Cup Company (“Solo”) for continuing 
to mark products after the applicable patent numbers had 
expired and for marking products with a statement that the 
article “may be covered” by a patent. Citing the language of the 
statute, Mr. Pequignot sought an award of $500 “per false 
marking.”70 As the court indicated, Solo marked billions of its 
products with the expired patent numbers.71 A quick run of the 
numbers indicates Mr. Pequignot was likely to come out ahead 
if his claims were successful. 
In defending itself, Solo first argued that marking an 
article with an expired patent cannot, as a matter of law, 
                                                          
reasonable in light of that evidence, but it must also be the single most 
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence . . . .”); Brose v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 768 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the plaintiff 
bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive). 
 66. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (citing Seven Cases of Eckman’s Alterative v. United States, 239 
U.S. 510, 517–18 (1916)). 
 67. Id. (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795–96 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 68. S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2424. 
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 70. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 650 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 71. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
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constitute a violation of the false marking statute.72 The court 
found unpersuasive Solo’s arguments that expired patents did 
not fall within the statute’s language or that public policy was 
better served by exempting expired patents from the false 
marking statute.73 As the court stated, such an exemption 
would injure the public’s ability to “assume ‘the status of the 
intellectual property’ by the simple presence of a ‘Patent No. 
XXX’ marking.”74 
More important than whether or not expired patents are 
within the false marking statute, Solo raised the constitutional 
question of whether Mr. Pequignot could properly bring suit 
where he had not sustained injury from Solo’s actions.75 
Furthermore, Solo argued that even if Mr. Pequignot did have 
constitutional standing to pursue an action under § 292, the 
action would violate the Take Care clause of Article II, § 3 of 
the Constitution.76 Citing the Supreme Court, the Eastern 
District of Virginia held that, as a partial assignee of the 
government’s claims through a qui tam action, Mr. Pequignot 
had Article III standing.77 The court also found no separation of 
powers problems because the first qui tam actions were enacted 
“before the ink on the Constitution was even dry”78 and the 
Executive Branch itself had intervened in the present case to 
defend the constitutionality of the statute.79 
Solo’s luck would change quickly, however. The facts of the 
case before the court did not favor Mr. Pequignot. There was no 
dispute that expired patent numbers had been marked on 
several of Solo’s products, and thus whether a violation 
occurred hinged upon whether Solo acted for the purpose of 
deceiving the public.80 The court rejected the argument that 
                                                          
 72. Pequignot, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 650. 
 73. Id. at 652–54. 
 74. Id. at 654. 
 75. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 715 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 76. Id. As the court indicated, “[T]he ‘Take Care’ Clause of Article II . . . 
requires that the President ‘shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.’ This provision, which grants the Executive Branch the power to 
enforce federal law, is part of the scheme of separation of powers, in which 
Congress passes laws, the President enforces them, and the judiciary 
interprets them.” Id. at 724 (internal citation omitted). 
 77. Id. at 724. 
 78. Id. at 726. 
 79. Id. at 728. 
 80. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). 
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knowledge of falsity is sufficient to establish conclusively intent 
to deceive. The court found persuasive Solo’s argument that it 
had developed and implemented a policy to replace 
manufacturing molds containing the expired patent numbers 
but that the process would take place gradually as the molds 
wore out due to an expected cost of $500,000.81 
Although there was “no need to address the meaning of 
‘offense’ in the damages provision of § 292,”82 the court provided 
its opinion on the matter anyway because of the probability 
that such commentary “could significantly effect [sic] the 
incentives for qui tam actions” in the future.83 The court 
indicated several plausible options including defining each 
falsely marked article as an “offense,” each decision to mark as 
an “offense,” 84 or, citing a novel approach employed by one 
court, each week of false marking as an “offense.”85 The 
Eastern District of Virginia chose to define “offense” as the 
“distinct decision to falsely mark”86 stating that, if Solo had 
possessed the requisite intent to deceive, Solo would have 
committed at most three offenses punishable by no more than 
$1500.87 
Notwithstanding that the court’s statements were dicta, 
the court was absolutely correct that such an interpretation of 
“offense” will greatly affect the incentive to bring a qui tam 
action. However, after finding that § 292 was indeed valid and 
enforceable, and clearly espousing the critical role the statute 
serves in protecting the patent system and the public, the 
Eastern District of Virginia seemed to have little difficulty in 
rendering the qui tam nature of the statute moot as applied. By 
imposing a penalty in the range of only hundreds of dollars a 
court certainly dissuades private individuals from bringing any 
future qui tam actions. Since the Solo decision, the Federal 
Circuit has taken the opportunity to correct the varied 
interpretations given to the statute and has indicated that the 
                                                          
 81. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793–94 (E.D. Va. 
2009). 
 82. Id. at 801. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 802 n.19 (citing Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. The Nautilus 
Group, Inc., No. 1:02CV109TC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24153, at *7 (D. Utah 
Mar. 23, 2006)). 
 86. Id. at 801. 
 87. Id. at 804. 
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statute requires a fine on a per article basis.88 It remains in the 
courts discretion, however, to impose a penalty anywhere from 
the maximum of $500 to as low as “a fraction of a penny” as the 
court deems proper.89 
In 1896, Odin B. Roberts offered prophetic words in a 
Harvard Law Review note regarding the fate of the false 
marking statute: 
It is clear, after a consideration of the cases under this statute, that 
the strictness of construction adopted by the courts, the heavy burden 
of proof which is imposed upon the informer, and the obvious 
difficulty of proving a fraudulent intent on the part of a defendant, 
combine to dissuade a person from undertaking the expense and 
trouble of litigation merely for the sake of plunder. Only a genuinely 
interested or inspired individual is likely to turn informer; and others 
are easily dissuaded from lodging complaint so soon as the true 
nature of their prospects is made clear to them. 
 
It is more than likely, therefore, that actions qui tam under the 
patent statutes will continue to be a rarity in the Federal courts.90 
Qui tam statutes rose to prominence in England only to be 
completely barred from use.91 Similarly, the qui tam statutes in 
the U.S. have decreased to the point that § 292 of the Patent 
Act is one of only four remaining qui tam actions.92 While cases 
such as Solo prove Odin’s statement is all too true, the good 
news for the patent system and the public at large is that the 
presence of alternative means for recovery, coupled with the 
limited damage that a violation of the statute causes to begin 
with, means that little harm is felt by removing the qui tam 
incentive from the false marking statute. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., the Eastern District of 
Virginia raises important issues that go straight to the core of 
the relevancy and efficacy of the false marking statute of the 
Patent Act. If the policies the statute was built upon are sound, 
that is, that false marking deceives consumers, stifles 
                                                          
 88. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Odin B. Roberts, Actions Qui tam under the Patent Statutes of the 
United States, 10 HARV. L. REV. 265, 274 (1896). 
 91. See Common Informers Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 39 (Eng.). 
 92. See supra note 9. 
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competition, chills innovation, and ultimately harms the patent 
system, Pequignot and others like him should be lauded as 
defenders of invention and compensated accordingly with 
generous verdicts. It is more likely, however, that the instinct 
that hesitates to allow recovery by a plaintiff lacking both 
injury and privity is justified. Pequignot and other informers 
should not be able to recover under a qui tam statute where the 
harm to the public and the patent system is limited. Where the 
injury is in fact extensive, however, the injured party should 
recover. In addition to the constitutional questions raised by a 
qui tam action for false patent marking, it appears there are 
sufficient mechanisms in place to deter the false marking of 
unpatented articles and provide remedy to those injured by 
false marking. 
A.  HOW AND TO WHAT DEGREE DOES FALSE MARKING HARM 
THE PATENT SYSTEM? 
In analyzing the language and application of the false 
marking statute, the first step 
necessarily involves looking at the harm the statute was 
created to prevent. From the day the statute was originally 
enacted “to protect the rights of patentees,” courts and 
commentators have reiterated the same general statements in 
support of the statute.93 As the court in Pequignot stated, 
“[p]atent markings are an essential component of [a carefully 
created patent] system.”94 They prevent burdening potential 
inventors and consumers with the hassle of looking up patent 
markings to determine validity.95 But, however wrong it may 
be for a producer to deceitfully mark an article, the harm to the 
patent system and to the public appears to have been at least 
partially overstated. 
1.  Harm to the Policies Underlying the Patent System 
The standard argument for creating a harsh penalty 
against false marking is that false marking undermines the 
very purpose of the patent system: incentivizing invention. 
                                                          
 93. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (“The marking statute serves three related purposes: 1) helping to 
avoid innocent infringement; 2) encouraging patentees to give notice to the 
public that the article is patented; and 3) aiding the public to identify whether 
an article is patented.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 94. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 95. Id. 
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According to this argument, would-be inventors will avoid a 
particular area upon seeing a marked article for fear of a costly 
infringement suit down the road.96 An invention marked with a 
patent marking “is, in effect, a ‘no trespassing’ sign,” a court 
has said.97 
This argument is unpersuasive for two related reasons. 
First, it is true that patent marking is analogous to a no-
trespassing sign with regards to the invention, but not 
necessarily with regard to the entire article that is marked. The 
presence of a patent marking may provide little or no 
information as to the actual subject matter covered by the 
patent. A potential inventor with the foresight to avoid 
infringement will presumably understand that the patent may 
apply to a feature that is less than completely intertwined with 
the function of the article. Even if the marked patent is 
accurate and valid, a patent search must be performed before 
an inventor can make an informed decision about entering or 
avoiding a market. 
Second, the entire patent system is based on public 
disclosure and accessibility of prior inventions. There is little 
better display of the patent system operating effectively than 
when an inventor properly “design[s] around” an existing 
patent to avoid infringement.98 “[I]ndeed one of the purposes of 
the patent disclosure system is to encourage this valuable form 
of competition.”99 Such innovation cannot take place unless 
patents are easily accessible. The more accessible such 
information is, the less of a threat false marking causes. If 
looking up a patent imposes too great a burden on a would-be 
inventor, perhaps the exchange of exclusive rights granted for 
public disclosure that the patent system is based upon needs to 
be recalibrated. 100 
                                                          
 96. See Rick Weiss, Op-Ed., The ‘Patent Pending’ Problem, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2009, at A13. 
 97. Pequignot, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 654. 
 98. See Rehrig Pac. Co. v. Norseman Plastics Ltd., No. SACV 03-00470-
JVS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27566, at *81–82 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2003) (citing 
State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). (“[c]onduct such as Smith’s, involving keeping track of competitor’s 
products and designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional 
equivalents is the stuff of which competition is made and is supposed to 
benefit the consumer.”)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. When information is not readily accessible, even accurate and lawful 
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2.  Harm to the United States Government 
Another argument for harshly penalizing false marking is 
that, because the government is the exclusive grantor of patent 
rights, false marking harms the government itself. Marking an 
unpatented article as patented commits a fraud upon the 
government. But, however fraudulent falsely marking an 
article may be, it seems the harm to the government is 
minimal. By marking an article as patented, one is telling the 
public that the article has some unique feature and that the 
requirements of the patent system have been satisfied. Despite 
the falsity of such a statement when the article is in fact 
unpatented, the value of the patent system is not likely to be 
diminished. 
In many scenarios, false statements made by an individual 
member of the market may have a negative effect on the 
perception consumers have of competing products. If a 
competitor makes false statements about its product, for 
example that it is made of fine cotton when in fact it is made of 
an inferior polyester blend, legitimate sellers of fine cotton may 
be harmed by a reduced perception of the quality of fine cotton 
among consumers.101 But does the same scenario play out in 
the context of false marking? That is, does marking an 
unpatented article as patented lessen the value of articles that 
truly are patented? The answer must be no. A patent confers no 
government endorsement as to the quality of the invention or 
suitability for a particular purpose. A patent merely recognizes 
that an invention is new, useful, non-obvious, and disclosed in 
compliance with a number of statutory requirements.102 That 
the patent marking was never intended to confer special status 
on the patentee in the marketplace indicates the patentee is 
not losing anything they were entitled to in the first place. 
3.  Harm to the Consumer and the Competition 
Generally, there is at least a perception among the lay 
public that an article marked as patented is superior in some 
way to unpatented articles. It is this perception that false 
markers attempt to take advantage of. As the Pequignot court 
stated, “[t]o the extent that there is any real injury caused by 
false marking, it is to competitors of the entity abusing patent 
                                                          
patent marking can unduly chill innovation and deter competition. 
 101. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 761 cmt. a (1939). 
 102. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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markings.”103 To the extent that consumers make purchasing 
decisions on the basis of patent coverage, truthful competitors 
are harmed. There is some doubt, however, whether patent 
coverage affects consumer decision making. One court denied 
recovery explicitly on the basis that false marking was not 
likely to affect purchasing decisions.104 Of course whether a 
patent marking is likely to affect a consumer’s decision likely 
depends on such factors as the complexity of the product and its 
cost, increases in either of which likely render deception less 
probable. However, in the event that consumers purchase on 
the basis of false representation and competitors are harmed, 
remedies would be available under a false marking statute 
absent a qui tam provision or through alternate means such as 
the Lanham Act.105 
Ultimately, there is no doubt that the intentional false 
marking of an unpatented article is wrong and should be 
remedied where injury results. However, a qui tam relator 
seeks to impose punishment even where injury is absent. It 
seems that decisions such as Solo that minimize the qui tam 
incentive for a potential relator is consistent with a limited 
level of harm that often ensues from a violation of the statute. 
B.  IS § 292 CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE? 
Solo asserted in its defense against Pequignot’s claims that 
the qui tam nature of the false marking statute is objectionable 
on constitutional grounds.106 Article III of the Constitution 
limits federal jurisdiction to the resolution of “Cases” or 
“Controversies.”107 The Supreme Court has elaborated that 
Article III requires three distinct elements for a plaintiff to 
have proper standing.108 First, a plaintiff must show an actual 
injury that is not conjectural or hypothetical.109 Second, the 
                                                          
 103. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 729 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 104. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57134, at *24 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) vacated in part, 590 F.3d 1295 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 105. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Del. 
1986); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 327 (E.D. Pa. 
1976); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 408 (N.D. Ill. 
1979). 
 106. Pequignot, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 715. 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 108. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 109. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
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plaintiff must be able to show a causal link between the 
defendant’s alleged behavior and the injury.110 Third, the 
requested relief must be likely to remedy the injury.111 
Historical arguments are often proffered in support of the 
constitutionality of qui tam actions. The First Congress, several 
members of which were involved in the drafting of the 
Constitution, enacted several qui tam statutes.112 Additionally, 
a long line of cases have consistently validated qui tam 
actions.113 Although qui tam statutes originated at the same 
time as the Constitution, this is not per se evidence of validity. 
“‘The long standing tradition [of the qui tam action] . . . 
provides no evidence that it fulfills the tests of injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability.’”114 
The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of 
qui tam actions, at least with respect to qui tam actions under 
the False Claims Act.115 In Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, the Court stated that 
the qui tam reward provided an interest in the outcome of the 
action but that it was only a “byproduct” of the suit and thus 
was insufficient to satisfy the injury portion of the three prong 
test.116 However, the Court found that a qui tam plaintiff has 
standing as an assignee of the United States’ injury suffered by 
violations of the False Claims Act and reiterated the historical 
significance of qui tam actions.117 According to the logic of the 
court, so long as the government’s alleged injury would satisfy 
Article III, Congress has authority to assign a claim to a 
private plaintiff.118 
Such a solution, however, seems to circumvent the 
                                                          
765, 771 (2000) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
 110. Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 
(1976)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 726 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 113. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 
714 F. Supp. 1084, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing Associated Indus. of New York 
State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943); Pub. Interest Bounty 
Hunters v. Bd. of Governors, 548 F. Supp. 157, 161 (N.D. Ga. 1982); 
Calderwood v. Mansfield, 71 F. Supp. 480, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1947). 
 114. Hamer, supra note 30, at 95. 
 115. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 771 (2000). 
 116. See id. at 775. 
 117. Id. 
 118. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
46 (16th ed. 2007). 
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underlying purposes of the standing requirement.119 Arguing 
that standing is an essential element of the separation of 
powers, Antonin Scalia stated that “‘the law of standing 
roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of 
protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the 
majority, [while excluding courts] from the even more 
undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches 
should function . . . .’”120 Such a concern is easily observed in 
the historical use of qui tam actions in England, where 
informers sought recovery without deference to prosecutorial 
discretion that would routinely be exercised if the Executive 
branch were bringing an action.121 
The logic of the Supreme Court is further tensioned when 
applied to § 292 because, as the Eastern District of Virginia 
stated, false patent marking “does not involve a proprietary 
injury to the United States . . . . To the extent that there is any 
real injury caused by false marking, it is to competitors of the 
entity abusing patent markings.”122 The government has little 
injury to assign. Competitors could be granted a private right of 
action against a false marker without the enactment of a qui 
tam statute.123 Considering the limited benefit provided by the 
qui tam nature of the false marking statute, coupled with the 
prospect of upsetting the constitutional balance served by the 
standing doctrine, Congress would be prudent in limiting 
recovery to competitors or others directly injured by a false 
marking. 
C.  WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE FALSE MARKING 
STATUTE? 
It appears that, as applied, § 292 has lost its identity as a 
qui tam statute under which anyone can bring a lawsuit. If the 
maximum recovery suggested by many courts continues to be 
accepted, there is virtually no situation in which the award to a 
relator will outweigh the cost of litigation absent exogenous 
considerations. Even when the fine for a violation of the statute 
                                                          
 119. Hamer, supra note 30, at 96. 
 120. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 46 (quoting Antonin Scalia, 
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element in the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV 881 (1983)). 
 121. Beck, supra note 10, at 583–84. 
 122. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 123. Id. 
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is prescribed on a per mark basis as the Federal Circuit has 
recently stated, a sufficient award is not guaranteed. Congress 
can intervene to restore the statute to its original form. On the 
other hand, perhaps Congress should affirm explicitly what the 
courts have done implicitly in eliminating the incentive for a 
qui tam relator to bring suit. After all, qui tam actions have not 
exactly withstood the test of time. The increasing scarcity of qui 
tam statutes evinces the lack of utility they offer. Moreover, the 
historical reasons for the creation of qui tam provisions no 
longer persist. Unlike the False Claims Act, premised in part 
on the idea that internal whistleblowers will most effectively 
bring hidden frauds to light,124 false marking is not usually 
detectable only by someone with inside information.125 Further, 
the decreased reliance on patent marking through increased 
accessibility of patent information has mitigated the threat 
posed by unscrupulous markers. Ultimately, the unfair 
advantage, if any, that a vendor obtains by selling an 
unpatented article as patented is addressed at the lowest cost 
by careful consumers or through litigation by individuals 
directly affected by the false marking. 
1.  The qui tam nature of the statute hinders enforceability 
One possible revision of the false marking statute is to 
interpret the statute in a more penalizing manner, imposing a 
fine on each falsely marked article. In late 2009, the Federal 
Circuit did exactly that. Such a decision seems consistent with 
the plain language of the statute which establishes a maximum 
penalty of $500, leaving it to the court’s discretion to weigh the 
appropriate level of punishment based on the harm and 
culpability of the defendant. The qui tam nature of the statute 
remains, however, presenting several problems to an otherwise 
logical solution. It seems that the statute is better off without 
the assistance of “10,000 lawyers.”126 
The absence of false marking cases at the circuit court level 
can be interpreted as an indicator that the statute is 
underutilized. Indeed, only ten appellate cases have been heard 
in the life of the statute.127 The reason for this phenomenon is 
                                                          
 124. See supra notes 35–36. 
 125. Perhaps in the case of items marked patent pending, a false marking 
would be difficult for the public to detect at least for 18 months, after which a 
publication should have issued. 
 126. 89 CONG. REC. 7606 (1943) (statement of Sen. Langer). 
 127. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
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attributable in part to the reasons that Odin B. Roberts 
predicted in 1896.128 Because of the qui tam nature of the 
statute, courts construe the statute with complete strictness, 
increasing an already difficult burden of proving fraudulent 
intent.129 Due to the difficulty in recovery, qui tam plaintiffs 
are hesitant to bring a suit. This fact evinces that almost all 
false marking cases have been between direct competitors. 
However, despite the presence of plaintiffs who appear to be 
directly injured by the defendant’s actions and who will likely 
benefit from a favorable decision, courts are hesitant to apply 
qui tam statutes in favor of plaintiffs. The historical abuses 
that have accompanied qui tam actions as well as the possible 
presence of a plaintiff with questionable standing to pursue an 
action in the court has encouraged courts to strictly construe 
qui tam actions in favor of defendants.130 Courts further limit 
recoverability under the false patent marking statute due to its 
criminal nature.131 It seems the statute could be a more 
effective mechanism against false marking absent a qui tam 
provision. 
Assume, hypothetically, that the statute was interpreted 
by the courts to allow recovery for each falsely marked article 
and the plaintiff’s burden of proving intent was reduced. The 
number of qui tam actions under the statute would certainly 
increase. A scenario directly analogous to such a proposition 
took place under the False Claims Act. In 1986, the recovery 
                                                          
2005); Arcadia Mach. & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 786 F.2d 1124 
(Fed. Cir. 1986); London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506 (1st Cir. 
1910); Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1980);Brose v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1972); Filmon Process Corp. v. 
Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Boyd v. Schildkraut 
Giftware Corp., 936 F.2d 76 (2nd Cir. 1991); G. Leblanc Corp. v. H. & A. 
Selmer, Inc., 310 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1962); Graffius v. Weather-Seal, 165 F.2d 
782 (6th Cir. 1948); Santa Anita Mfg. Corp. v. Lugash, 369 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 
1966). 
 128. Roberts, supra note 90, at 274. 
 129. Id. 
 130. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 1942) 
(“That dislike has been implemented in court decisions for informer statutes 
have been construed with utmost strictness.”). 
 131. See French v. Foley, 11 F. 801, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1882) (“The rule that 
penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than 
construction itself.’”) (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (5 
Wheat.) (1820)). 
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available under the statute was greatly increased132 with 
dramatic results. No recovery was had by a qui tam relator 
under the statute in 1987.133 A mere ten years later, 533 suits 
were filed and the government recovered $629.9 million.134 
There is little doubt that a similar result could be achieved 
with the Patent Act. Qui tam relators have generally been 
looked upon with skepticism, however, and for good reason. The 
abuses present in the English system of qui tam enforcement 
would likely reappear, even if to a lesser degree, with an 
increased opportunity to reap a large payout. 
The most important factor in arguing against increasing 
the incentive for a qui tam relator to bring an action under the 
false marking statute, however, is that the increased costs of 
such a statute would be unwarranted based on the limited 
degree and limited scope of harm caused by false patent 
marking in cases involving qui tam plaintiffs. The addition of 
more stringent penalties will likely impose costs that are 
greater than, or at least unlikely to remedy the damage of, 
those caused by false marking.135 As one scholar explained: 
[D]eterrence, or deterrence plus compensation, can never be the 
exclusive goals of a regulatory regime. . . . At some point, additional 
enforcement efforts or stiffer penalties impose costs on the public, on 
regulated individuals, or on third parties that threaten to outweigh 
any corresponding deterrence and compensation gains. A rational 
regulatory system seeks an optimal level of enforcement—one that 
adequately fulfills the statutory purposes while minimizing social 
costs.136 
There is little room for argument that potential qui tam 
relators prowling for a vulnerable false mark would spur 
manufacturers to honestly and accurately mark their products. 
But the benefit is unlikely to be worth the resulting cost to 
                                                          
 132. See The False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 
116 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733). 
 133. Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui tam Provisions and the Public 
Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 955 (2007). 
 134. Id. 
 135. As the Solo Cup court stated, the damage, if any is present, is felt by 
competitors. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728 (E.D. Va. 
2009). Of course the false marker will be deterred from illicit marking even if 
the penalty is being paid to an uninjured relator and the government. 
However, the cost passed on to consumers may not be worth the benefit of a 
marketplace free of inaccurate patent markings. Limiting suits to competitors 
or other damaged parties, as the statute currently achieves as applied, 
prevents such wasted costs from being incurred. 
 136. Beck, supra note 10, at 609–10. 
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manufacturers, a cost eventually passed on to consumers in 
some form. 
The facts of the Solo case provide an appropriate example 
of the magnitude of the costs at issue. Correcting the marking 
of Solo’s products was estimated to be $500,000 dollars.137 Of 
course, the case was decided on the grounds that Solo lacked 
specific intent to deceive the public. However, imagine a 
slightly altered fact scenario in which the defendant similarly 
lacks the intent to deceive but has not yet implemented a 
formal plan of correcting the markings, thus lacking the 
evidence Solo was able to proffer in its defense. Should the 
defendant in this case be penalized for false marking? Perhaps 
the answer is yes where a plaintiff who has been injured by the 
false marking is bringing the lawsuit. Further, where a 
competitor has been injured, consumers have necessarily been 
injured as well. A lawsuit under § 292 would provide remedy to 
the harm while deterring prohibited conduct in the future. In 
the event that a qui tam relator is bringing suit where an 
injured competitor is not present, however, perhaps a penalty is 
not warranted. Where an injured party is absent, the costs of 
the lawsuit itself would be inefficient with no resulting benefit 
to the public. Such an action would never be brought absent an 
artificially created award. 
Consider as another example a situation in which a vendor 
clearly intends to deceive consumers with a false patent 
marking but fails to do so. Surely some penalty should be 
imposed for the fraudulent intent. But since there is no injury, 
there is no injured plaintiff to bring a lawsuit. Allowing a 
relator to profit in such a situation seems unwarranted since 
there is little public benefit that can result from the relator’s 
enforcement. Ultimately, the optimal level of enforcement is 
most easily determined by the actions of parties injured by 
false marking rather than by a relator seeking to profit from a 
violation of the statute. 
Even if the harm of false marking is seen as warranting 
greater punishment than the current false marking statute 
provides, the qui tam nature will likely act as a hindrance to an 
effective statute. The ability of an uninjured party to bring an 
action has cornered the courts into an interpretation of the 
false marking statute that provides minimal punishment. By 
                                                          
 137. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793 (E.D. Va., 2009). 
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removing qui tam relators, the statute could be amended to 
properly address the harm of false marking while reducing the 
risk of an analogous increase in unwanted social costs of 
inefficient litigation. 
2.  False Patent Marking as False Advertising 
In many ways, false patent marking exhibits very few 
differences than any other form of false advertising. Labeling 
an unpatented product as patented is comparable to labeling a 
product or its promotional materials with the message that the 
product contains an exclusive feature that can only be found in 
the particular product. Because of the similarities, false 
advertising laws such as § 43(a) of the Lanham Act provide a 
suitable model for discussing the most desirable embodiment of 
a false marking statute.138 Even better, the Lanham Act itself 
can provide a mechanism to a party that finds itself injured by 
false marking. 
Five elements are required for recovery under the Lanham 
Act in the patent context.139 A plaintiff must prove that: 
1) the defendant has made false or misleading statements of fact 
concerning his own product or another’s; 2) the statement actually 
deceives or tends to deceive a substantial portion of the intended 
audience; 3) the statement is material in that it will likely influence 
the deceived consumer’s purchasing decisions; 4) the advertisements 
were introduced into interstate commerce; and 5) there is some causal 
link between the challenged statements and harm to the plaintiff.140 
Several courts have held that false or misleading claims of 
patent protection undoubtedly violate § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act.141 In fact, the elements of the Lanham Act seem 
particularly well suited to address the issue of false marking. 
First, requiring some level of harm to the plaintiff removes the 
skepticism courts have exhibited in allowing uninjured relators 
to recover. Further, the plaintiff must show that the false 
marking is somehow material. A claim will be denied under the 
                                                          
 138. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 139. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
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Lanham Act even if a product marking is clearly false where no 
injury results from the marking.142 And, importantly, the 
evidence of causation a plaintiff must introduce to support a 
claim depends upon the relief sought.143 As the Eighth Circuit 
noted, “[a]n injunction, as opposed to money damages, is no 
windfall to the commercial plaintiff.”144 Because money 
damages primarily benefit the competitor, however, a higher 
standard of causation is required.145 Ultimately, § 43(a) 
provides a form of relief against false patent marking without 
the problems associated with the qui tam nature of the false 
marking statute of the Patent Act. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the scope of false patent marking, one thing is clear: the 
qui tam provision is little more than a remnant of history that 
limits the efficacy of the statute. Courts such as the Eastern 
District of Virginia appear correct in strictly construing the 
statute so as to prevent a plaintiff from easily recovering where 
no injured party is present. Increasing the penalty of false 
patent marking only benefits informers at a cost to the public 
while providing little additional remedy where an injury has 
actually occurred. The ability of qui tam informers to bring suit 
does little more than hinder the recovery of victims who truly 
have suffered an injury as a result of false patent marking. 
Although the qui tam provision of the false marking statute 
raises serious constitutional questions, these questions need 
not be addressed because the statute appears better off free of 
qui tam litigants. Absent a provision allowing qui tam litigants 
to pursue an action, courts will be free to appropriately enforce 
the statute without fear of attracting informers looking to cash 
in on violations of the law. 
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